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Thursday, October 28, 2004

Cover-up in the Military

By: Raphael Martin/Glenda M. Gloria,
Contributing Writer/Managing Editor
Newsbreak (October 28, 2004)

This is the sad story of how military generals protect their own, and why.

As early as January 2004, the Armed Forces leadership got wind of reports that about US$100,000 being taken to the US in December 2003 by a son of Maj. Gen. Carlos F. Garcia had been intercepted at an American airport for being undeclared. The military leadership did not lift a finger to verify the reports, much less investigate the elder Garcia.

In March, claiming he had no hard evidence to prove the “rumors,” Gen. Narciso Abaya, Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) chief of staff, chose an easy way out of the mess: he transferred Garcia from the lucrative position of J6 (AFP deputy chief of staff for comptrollership) to J5 (AFP deputy chief of staff for plans and programs), which has the lowest budgets of all the J-staff offices in Camp Aguinaldo.

Over dinner in early August with NEWSBREAK, after we wrote a blind item on the US airport incident, Abaya disclosed that he had been “hearing things” about Garcia, thus his decision to move him to J5. “At least, walang pera doon (There’s no money in that office),” he explained.

The transfer didn’t sit well with some officers.

From March to June, the recalcitrant Army Col. Ricardo “Dick” Morales—one of the presidential guards of former President Ferdinand Marcos who joined the rebel movement that staged a coup against him in 1986—pestered Abaya with text messages asking him two questions: first, if the reports about Garcia’s son were true; second, what the AFP leadership intended to do about it. Abaya himself had told NEWSBREAK that “Morales has been busy texting me about Garcia.”

By July, feeling nothing was being done about it, Morales decided to write Abaya. In his July 15 letter, Morales told the AFP chief that as far as he knew, the US had already relayed the information to the Intelligence Service of the AFP (Isafp). It was the talk in military camps. While he didn’t want to prejudge Garcia, Morales told Abaya, the comptroller had to come clean for the sake of the institution.

Morales also asked Abaya if Garcia’s transfer to J5 had something to do with the US incident. Morales thought: Is Abaya now sending signals to the AFP that the J5, which attracts the strategists and good writers in the military, is a lounging area for the corrupt?

Abaya called up Morales and ordered him to bring his complaint to the AFP Office of Ethical Standards and Public Accountability (OESPA), the unit tasked to look into complaints against soldiers. Morales did, only to be asked by an OESPA officer for advice on how they should proceed from that information. The head of the OESPA, Vice Admiral Ariston de los Reyes Jr., who was Garcia’s classmate in the Philippine Military Academy (PMA), did not deem it necessary to inhibit himself from the case.

“We did not know who among the US authorities we were supposed to deal with regarding the incident. The information from the letter only said so much,” De los Reyes told NEWSBREAK. The AFP was satisfied with Garcia’s August 2 letter to Abaya explaining that the money had come from loans from friends and relatives.
If the military bosses wanted to probe Garcia’s dollar possessions and other assets in the US, they would have gotten results—easily.

The Philippine military is the staunchest ally of the US in the region, and Abaya, a West Point graduate, has extensive personal and official networks with American authorities. The Philippine-US Joint Defense Assessment has been in place since last year, a mechanism that allows officials from the Pentagon and the US Pacific Command to assist the military on key reform areas.

One phone call by Abaya would have led to a discreet probe of Garcia’s properties in the US and an accounting of how much his family had carried through US airports in the last few years.

Internally, the chief of staff enjoys the power of moral suasion over his peers. Abaya, even if he is chair of the board of the AFP Savings and Loans Association Inc. (AFPSLAI) where Garcia has millions in deposits, could not poke into the transactions since the bank is covered by Central Bank rules. But through informal channels, the chief of staff can get information from the bank, which is run by retired military officers.

Abaya, however, told a House hearing that he needed time to gather evidence against Garcia and that “we were already overtaken” by the Ombudsman’s actions.

Two things stopped the AFP high command from investigating Garcia: the unchecked, antiquated procurement and disbursement system in the AFP and the culture that pervades among men in uniform.
It doesn’t help that the defense secretary, lawyer Avelino Cruz, is new on the job. While many favor the appointment of a civilian to the helm of the defense department, Cruz has a handicap at this crucial time: he barely knows the complex organization to be able to crack the whip on it.

“He has to fight tooth and nail to change the culture [in the military],” said Orlando Mercado, the first civilian defense secretary in the post-Marcos era.

Lucky General

Until his questionable wealth was exposed, Garcia had the best of both worlds. He belonged to two powerful cliques in the Armed Forces: the class of 1971 of the PMA, which includes Abaya (who graduated on the same year from West Point but is included in the PMA Alumni Registry as a member of the class) and the so-called comptroller family, a tight, exclusive bloc of military officers who corner appointments to comptrollership positions. If one is to find another explanation for this stroke of luck, Garcia, like Abaya, is an Ilocano.

Until last year, Garcia was class president of the Class 1971 alumni. A PMA classmate describes him as a “very generous” officer.

No senior officer of the AFP in recent history has been punished for corruption or incompetence in the battlefield. At the most, they are transferred to remote provinces, put on a “floating” status, or, like Garcia, named to a low-budget unit.

Two senior generals had been investigated and charged with corruption in high-profile cases—but only after they had retired. They were former AFP chief of staff Gen. Lisandro Abadia and his PMA classmate (1962), retired Brig. Gen. Jose Ramiscal Jr.

Abadia was former comptroller of the Army (G-6) while Ramiscal was former J6. Ramiscal is facing 24 graft cases and 148 counts of estafa before the Sandiganbayan for allegedly mismanaging the AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits System (RSBS). A similar graft case was recommended by the Senate against Abadia, and this is still pending with the Ombudsman. Both men were charged by civilian agencies.

In January 2002, the AFP investigated four Army and Air Force officers for their involvement in selling duty-free goods in the black market in East Timor, where they were assigned as part of the United Nations peacekeeping force. The case was so embarrassing to the country that the military leadership threatened to dismiss them from service. Today, the alleged leader of the black market group, Army Col. Allan Bontuyan, is the deputy commander of an Army task force based in northern Mindanao. The military had cleared him.
Garcia undoubtedly knew the military culture well enough to get reckless in the last two years before his scheduled retirement in November 18 this year.

In 2002 alone, immigration records showed that he made a dozen trips abroad—Europe, US, Singapore, Hong Kong—even if his work didn’t require him to do so. The same records obtained by NEWSBREAK showed that the general made seven trips abroad in 2003, including a trip to Europe in early December with his wife, a military aide, and the latter’s wife. After that European trip, Garcia went to the US on Dec. 29, 2003. Between the Europe and US trip was the incident of December 19, when his son was apprehended at the San Francisco airport for failing to declare $100,000. The son was traveling with his younger brother.

It was in 2002, a year after his appointment to J6, that Garcia’s bank deposits and properties rose. That year, his deposits in AFPSLAI reached P7 million. In 2003, he took $200,000 to the US as downpayment for two posh condominium units in New York. From January to March this year, he made three outward dollar transmittals amounting to P27 million.

Estimates show he must have brought P71 million to the US from 1993 to last year, enough to buy 71,000 pairs of boots for soldiers or provide a one-year meal allowance to 6,500 troops.

Marcelo’s shock

Unfortunately for Garcia, Ombudsman Simeon Marcelo has been busy training his field investigators and prosecutors. Bogged down by a meager budget when he was appointed to the post in 2001, Marcelo had to tap grant money to help him improve the work of his staff. Among the aid agencies that have been funding Marcelo’s training programs is the US government’s aid agency that has been working in the Philippines for a long time now—the USAID.

Early this year, upon Marcelo’s request, Usaid brought officials from the US Customs and the Federal Bureau of Investigation to give a lecture to Ombudsman investigators. That’s when Marcelo personally met with officials of these agencies, who have since kept in touch with him. And that’s why Marcelo got to pin down Garcia—not because of some US conspiracy, as raised by Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile and other sectors, to pressure the Arroyo government to be tougher on terrorists.

During an October 9 forum sponsored by the Presidential Management Staff in MalacaƱang, Marcelo talked about the Garcia affair, which he described as “tsamba” (luck) for his office. “When these US Customs officials were here, they mentioned to me over dinner that they have anti-corruption officials who monitor movement of assets such as in the airports,” Marcelo recalled. “So I told them that since I am investigating officials from the Customs, Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), and Bureau of Internal Revenue, perhaps they should help me.” The three agencies are perceived to be the most corrupt. Marcelo asked the Americans to inform him of any suspicious entry of money to the US from the Philippines in the last 12 months, hoping this could yield familiar names from these agencies.

“To my shock and surprise, on September 14 they transmitted to me a list of the amount that General Garcia has brought to the US,” Marcelo said. “It was manna from heaven.”

Garcia’s case has somehow upset the Ombudsman’s timetable. For this year and the next, he has been training his guns on the top three agencies. “My timetable for the military was 2006 yet…but the case is already here and I can’t turn my back on it.”

The military was reluctant at first to give the Ombudsman all the records pertaining to Garcia, Marcelo disclosed. He got all the data he needed by issuing the AFP a subpoena. On September 28, finding a prima facie case against Garcia, Marcelo ordered him suspended for six months without pay.

When the news broke, Abaya could not even persuade Garcia to present himself to the media. The AFP initially refused to produce an official photograph of the man; the media had to rely on a charcoal portrait displayed in his office. Yet, when the military exposed some of its officers for allegedly campaigning for the opposition in the last elections, military officials not only identified them, they immediately had them grounded and recalled to headquarters.

The high command waited almost two weeks after Garcia’s suspension before filing court-martial proceedings against him, and only after the President ordered them to do so. A court-martial case gives the military immediate and total custody of an accused. The delay allowed Garcia to leave his quarters, withdraw P19 million from AFPSLAI, and plot his defense.

‘Comptroller Mafia’

How could Garcia have enriched himself so fast? And why is the military afraid to touch him?

It’s not quite accurate to say that Garcia is a mere sacrificial lamb in this sordid affair. As J6 from March 2001 to September this year, Garcia was a power center all by himself. Officers from captains to generals went to him if they needed approval for more allocation for their units, allowance for their travels, or money for social activities, like Christmas parties.

Besides, Garcia was secure as a member of the comptroller family—an elite bloc of former and current military comptrollers in the AFP and its major service commands. Among the former chiefs of staff who belong to the comptroller family are Abadia and retired general Roy Cimatu.

Officers interviewed by NEWSBREAK call them “the comptroller mafia.” As such, they follow a certain career path that assures them the comptroller post most of the time in their careers, according to a former Army chief. They usually treat combat assignments as mere requirements; they know that they will always land in a comptroller job after months in the battlefield.

In most cases, a comptroller who is scheduled to retire or assigned to the field will make sure that it is officers from the “family” who will replace him, the same source says.

The AFP has a comptroller eligibility list, a short list of military officers qualified to be comptrollers. “Once you’re there, you become associated with the mafia one way or the other,” says an Air Force general. Garcia didn’t spend much time with the comptroller family before he became J6; he used to be logistics officer of the Army (June 1992 to November 1993). However, he began his career in the military as a comptroller for the 51st engineering brigade in the 1970s.

The Army’s engineering brigade is another unit that deserves scrutiny. Garcia spent at least nine years there. Because it does road projects for the national and local governments, the brigade gets its resources not only from the AFP but from the national government as well. It is a beneficiary of pork barrel funds from lawmakers. Ideally, the brigade should just do work for military purposes; some officers say that its mission should be reassessed.

Garcia was the Army’s chief of engineers when he was promoted to J6 in March 2001, shortly after Edsa 2. Gen. Diomedio Villanueva, the chief of staff at the time, told NEWSBREAK that Garcia’s appointment “was already approved by MalacaƱang” when he took over as AFP boss.

Garcia’s predecessor was Jacinto Ligot, now a retired major general and a known close associate of Angelo Reyes, whom Villanueva replaced as AFP chief and who is now interior and local government secretary. Ligot owns a unit in the posh Essensa Towers in Makati City, says a former defense official.

“They take care of each other,” says the official. When comptrollers are required to take field assignments, chances are they will succeed in these command posts because of financial support from the “comptroller family.” The official adds: “They never fail in the field because bubuhusan sila ng pera ng mga kasama nilang comptroller.”

The source cites the case of former AFP budget officer Army Col. George Rabusa, who is now with the Central Command (Cencom) in the Visayas but who was investigated by the Ombudsman for unexplained wealth in 2002. To take the heat off Rabusa, his superiors sent him to Cencom, which was then commanded by Ligot, his former boss at J6.

The new J6 who replaced Garcia is Brig. Gen. Antonio L. Romero, who also once served as deputy J6.

Arroyo’s flawed style

Garcia is the only J6 to have served five AFP chiefs of staff. Blame this on President Arroyo’s preference during her first term for appointing favorite generals to the top AFP post even if they were to retire in a few months. This somehow ensured Garcia’s tenure because no short-term chief of staff would dare replace his budget adviser.

“I saw no need to replace him when I assumed office,” retired AFP chief Gen. Dionisio Santiago admitted. “Why should I when I would be serving for only four months?” Even if he served for only four months (November 2002 to April 2003), Santiago claimed he was able to finish 14 building projects—and Garcia, he said, made sure all these were amply funded. Aside from Villanueva and Santiago, the other chiefs of staff served by Garcia were: Cimatu (May 2002 to September 2002), Benjamin Defensor (September 2002 to November 2002), and Abaya (April 2003 to November 2004).

Overlooked by Abaya was one of the recommendations last year by the Feliciano Commission that investigated the causes of the July 2003 Oakwood mutiny: for junior and senior comptrollers in the AFP to serve only for two years at the most in their posts.

A former comptroller told NEWSBREAK that it was unwise for the leadership to keep an officer as comptroller until his retirement. “You don’t retire a comptroller at his post because if he turns out to be a bad choice and an abusive one, then you are courting trouble,” he said. He laments that their work has been tainted by abusive officers. “We tried in the past to establish criteria on who can be comptrollers…that it should not be just anyone else…unfortunately, such has been set aside.”

Prized post

Comptrollership used to be a mere technical job.

In the 1970s and ’80s, PMAers looked down on this work so that only the non-PMAers and commissioned officers applied for the post. The prestigious staff positions then were intelligence and operations.

Now it’s the other way around: military classes for comptrollership sometimes have to shut off officers seeking to attend advanced courses for this work. Enrolment in intelligence courses, on the other hand, is thinning.

In the past, commanders and J-staff officers had control of their allocations, but the J6 has emerged as the central clearing house for all AFP money. All the J-staff and major commands now pass their request for allocation to the J6, which has the final say.

Comptrollers in all levels in the AFP (down to the battalions) are the chief financial advisers of commanders on how their budgets may be used. The J6 is the principal financial adviser of the chief of staff. He controls the disbursement of funds in the whole AFP and determines who receives how much. The J6 has the power to evaluate the mission accomplishment reports of these units and determine if they deserve the resources they are getting.

Said the Feliciano Commission in its 2003 report: “Not surprisingly, a commander tends to follow the comptroller’s advice on how [an allotment advice] can be utilized to generate cash or supplies.”
It is the J6 who drafts and presents the AFP budget to Congress for approval. Three officers say the J6 can “to a certain extent” hold the chief of staff hostage because of the special “skills” that he possesses and the dependence of the chief of staff on quick money for operations.

Thus, Garcia was not being forthright when he told a House hearing that his duty as J6 was “simply ministerial.”

Conversion

Still, these powers don’t mean much when one is dealing with a fixed budget that is subject to audit.

But the AFP has institutionalized a “creative” way of converting its allocation to cash with fake receipts from dealers and suppliers with connivance among commanders, comptrollers, and logistics officers. In this system of conversion, the AFP can, for example, request equipment from a certain supplier, who gives receipts for non-existent supplies. The request is approved and converted to cash, but the money goes to operations or to the pockets of commanders. Conniving suppliers get a share as well.

The AFP had to resort to conversion in the 1970s to skirt a very circuitous procurement and disbursement process not suitable for an organization fighting a war. Now, the AFP procurement process has two categories: actual procurement and procurement for “constructive purposes (conversion).” And the AFP has two kinds of dealers and suppliers: the legitimate ones and those who are used for conversion purposes only.
The J6’s operating arm, the headquarters comptroller, does the duty of “converting” the budget for use by units, says former Army Capt. Rene Jarque. This is where generals “convert” their budget for allowances, he adds.

Also, by juggling the allocation for the AFP (its budget this year is P50 billion), the J6 can approve requests for allocation that in reality may go to those who have the power to poke into AFP affairs: lawmakers and the Commission on Audit. At least one congressman who has been quite noisy over the Garcia controversy has benefited from J6 largesse because he controls some of the AFP dealers and suppliers in the “conversion” category, according to two senior officers.

And when an AFP chief retires, it’s SOP for the J6 to prepare a “pabaon” or going-away gift for him, amounting to millions of pesos.

The comptroller is also overall in charge of allocating “defense support fund,” a euphemism for a slush fund. It’s an internal illicit arrangement whereby generals are given monthly allowances of at least P50,000 that are given through operating units and don’t appear in their payrolls.

All this seemed routine for Garcia. Until the heavens fell on him.

Tuesday, October 26, 2004

Why We Are Poor and On Endless Crisis: A Theory To Ponder

The roots of crisis: A neo-colonial state preserved as a raw material economy by the geopolitical requirements of U.S. post-war imperialism; and what is to be done.

By: Alejandro Lichauco
Paper prepared for delivery before the Pilgrims for Peace scheduled October 27, 2004, Quezon City.

Introductory

Any attempt to understand the essence and roots of the nation's crisis must begin with recognition of the nature of the Philippine state. The Philippines isn't - and one must stress that - a sovereign, independent state that it is assumed to be and which its constitution claims it is.

A neocolonial state

The Philippines is a neocolonial state - which, by definition, means a state that is sovereign and independent in theory but which in fact is the colony of another, or of others. As a people, we are the classic victim of what Webster's New World Dictionary calls neocolonialism and which it defines as "the exploitation of a supposedly independent nation as by imposing a puppet government."

This has been so from the day and moment that we assumed the status of sovereign nationhood in 1946. That sovereign nationhood was pure fiction. It was pure fiction because the colonial power which supposedly returned to us the independence which it had wrested from Bonifacio's revolution never really left and never really allowed us to exist and act as a free and sovereign people.

The process by which we have been preserved as a neocolony is a story of its own, and neither time nor space allows that I deal with it in detail. It should suffice to focus on the essentials of that process. We have been preserved as a neocolonial state through the flagrant and systematic intervention of the U.S. government in our political process and in the creation of a collaborator class.

Neocolonialist intervention, of course, hasn't been confined to the political process. You see and feel the hand of that intervention in just about every aspect of Philippine society and the political economy. You see and feel it not only in government and politics but in the business community, in our schools, civil society, media and even the churches.

But the intervention has been most crucial and fatal at the level of our presidential politics. As the late and former President Diosdado Macapagal admitted in an article he wrote for the Bulletin a few years before he passed away, the U.S. government has been a decisive factor in every presidential election since 1935, and no presidential aspirant objectionable to Washington has ever been elected president. By the same token, any sitting president who manages to displease Washington invariably winds up unseated by Washington. That has been generally the fate of all incumbent presidents. They were mounted to office by Washington and eventually unseated by Washington.

That's how puppet governments are mounted and that's essentially how we have been preserved as a neocolonial state.

But that's for another paper. At the moment we are focused on the economic crisis.

The fiscal crisis as a diversionary issue

The fiscal crisis, which you invited me to discuss, is in truth only one of the many facets of the economic crisis that grips the nation. There is the crisis of the peso, the crisis of unemployment and inflation; there is the crisis of the industrial and agricultural sectors, and there is the overall crisis of underdevelopment and poverty.

There is the crisis of the very economic system by which we have lived all these years.

To be lured into a discussion of the fiscal crisis therefore is to be lured away from a discussion of the totality of the crisis and the nature as well as the root of that crisis. And that I suggest to you is exactly what the enemies of the state intend. They intend to lure us away from an examination of the total crisis and to trivialize that crisis by luring us into a discussion of what they call the "fiscal-debt crisis."

But it is the essence and root of the total economic crisis that we should focus on.

The economic crisis as the crisis of a neocolonial state

If we have a total economic crisis in our hands - a crisis whose most visible and terrifying manifestation is the mass hunger, and not only the mass poverty, that now grips the land and which government itself has acknowledged - it is because in this post-industrial age, we remain a nation of 80 million mired in the pre-industrial stage of history.

The question is: Why have we remained stuck in the pre-industrial age of history when neighbors once more impoverished and backward than we are have either graduated, or are dramatically in the process of graduating, into the age of science and industry?

And the answer is that it has been planned that way.

From the beginning, it was planned in Washington that the Philippines shall remain essentially a raw material economy in order to service the raw material requirements of an industrial Japan.

The Dodds Report and the origin of the Philippine crisis

In 1946, the Truman administration adopted the recommendation of the report which proposed that Japan be developed as the primary, if not sole, industrial powerhouse in the Asia-Pacific region and that countries like the Philippines should be preserved as raw material economies, obviously to service the requirements of Japan's factories. As the Asia-Pacific war came to a close, the U.S. obviously made a fateful decision to utilize Japan as the base from which to project U.S. military power, and that required the development of Japan as an industrial powerhouse. But since Japan is a nation bereft of natural resource, the plan obviously required that countries like the Philippines be preserved as raw material economics to ensure Japan with a continuing and permanent source of raw material.

We owe our knowledge of the Dodds Report to the late Salvador Araneta who, during his self-exile in Canada during the martial law years, uncovered the existence of the document and denounced it in his book America's Double? Cross of the Philippines.

These were Araneta's denunciatory words, as he explained the failure of the nation to industrialize: "The indifferent economic development of the country ... was due to America's policy toward Japan and the Philippines. This policy was the result of the Dodds Report which Truman accepted and which had as its objective to make Japan the industrial workshop of Asia and the Philippines a mere supplier of raw materials."

As Araneta bitterly continued: "We do not argue against the wisdom of providing Japan with the means to rehabilitate herself and allowed to become an industrial country once again, although this was contrary to the prior recommendation of a post-war planning committee headed by Secretary Morganthau, a recommendation which was in line with the prevailing sentiment at the end of the war. But certainly we can argue against a policy that would make Japan the exclusive industrialized country in the Far East, for such a policy was most detrimental to the Philippines. Indeed, the United States could not justify a policy that provided all kinds of stumbling blocks, to the industrialization of her ally (Philippines) in the war against Japan. As a result of this policy, industrialization in the Philippines suffered severe setbacks…”

It was a division of labor, or of functions, which the Dodds, Report crafted for America's allies in the Far East.

The Dodds Report explains the continuing obsession to this day of U.S. foreign policy to keep the Philippines a free and open market for imports because a liberal import policy - another name for free trade - ensures that this country will never be able to industrialize and take the same protectionist, nationalistic developmental strategy that enabled once poorer neighbors like Taiwan, Malaysia and Thailand, to transform into the newly industrialized countries that they are today.

The geopolitical plan embodied in the Dodds Report explains what the late Claro M. Recto described as "America's anti? industrialization policy for the Philippines."

Although Recto had no knowledge of the existence of the Dodds Report at the time - its existence would surface only in the '70s after Araneta exposed it - his enormous analytical power enabled him to deduce from policy statements of U.S. officials that behind U.S. policy in this country was a malevolent design to see to it that we never industrialize.

Conclusive proof of what Recto described as America's "anti-industrialization policy for the Philippines" came when Marcos formally launched an industrialization program in the late ‘70s based on 11 heavy industries led by the steel, petrochemical and engineering industries. The announcement of that plan was swiftly followed by protest from the IMF and the World Bank and the pro-American technocrats in the Marcos cabinet led by no less than his then Prime Minister. In the end, after four years of struggle with the IMF, the World Bank and his own technocrats over his industrialization plan, Marcos gave up the plan but not until after he had expressly denounced a conspiracy between his own technocrats and the IMF-WB to keep the Philippines under the heels of the industrial powers.

Soon after his election to the presidency, Joseph Estrada in an interview with Asiaweek confirmed that the U.S. has indeed sabotaged the industrialization plan of Marcos.

The U.S. anti-industrialization policy for the Philippines is what those IMF conditionalities are really about. The anti-industrialization policy has been implemented all these years through the IMF conditionalities and it isn't any coincidence that for the last forty years this country has been under the continuous economic supervision of the IMF.

There is no country in the world that can claim to be under the supervision of the IMF for even a fraction of that time. And it isn't coincidence either that this country, which has been under the continuous supervision of the IMF for 40 years, is the only country in the region that isn't making any headway toward industrialization.

When the Asean was founded in the early 160s by the Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and Singapore, not a single one of them was an NIC. Today, only the Philippines remains outside the magic circle of NICs. The four other co-founders of the Asean are now acknowledged NICs.

That should explain why the Philippines has the longest and oldest communist insurgency in the region.

A nation of 80 million without even the capability to produce a decent hammer or a decent toy gun can't possibly have any future except hunger.

We are today a hungry people in a land so fertile that one can drop a seed anywhere and see it sprout into something he can eat. And we are hungry because we are a nation frozen by design in the pre-industrial age, preserved as a raw material economy.

The essence and root of our crisis, to stress, are to be found in the nature of the Philippines as a neocolonial state preserved by U.S. post-war imperialism as a raw material economy to service the raw material requirements of an industrial Japan.

The treason of the Edsa Constitution: Art. X1 1, sec. 1, par 2 and the constitutionalization of the formula for underdevelopment and poverty

The ultimate tragedy of a neocolonial state is that even its own Constitution becomes an instrument of its own and perpetual enslavement.

And the Philippine case is a classic illustration.

I invite your attention to Art. XII, Sec. 1, par. 2 of the Constitution which reads as follows: "The State shall promote industrialization and full employment based on sound agricultural development and agrarian reform through industries that make full and efficient use of human and natural resources, and which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets. However, the State shall protect Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign competition and trade practices.”

That provision you will note automatically prohibits an industrial policy based on the heavy industries and the application of protectionist measures against foreign competition, whether fair or unfair. While the provision stipulates that the "State shall promote industrialization" it simultaneously qualifies that constitutional directive with an entire complex of conditions and limiting reservations which makes it impossible for the State to adopt any industrialization strategy other than one that is specifically and exclusively based on "sound agricultural development and agrarian reform" whatever that means. For example, the provision literally prohibits an industrialization strategy based on the heavy industries, like steel, chemicals, machine tools and machine production.

But that's precisely the kind of strategy that made NICS of our neighbors. Our neighbors - particularly South Korea and Taiwan - didn't transform into newly industrialized countries through the industrialization strategy explicitly mandated by the above-cited provision of our Constitution. Those countries, imitating Japan, pursued an industrialization strategy anchored on the development of industries based on and moved by machine power rather than on "sound agricultural development and agrarian reform."

A real industrialization program is one that is based on what is known as the capital goods industry - industries based on machine power and the production of what is known as the means of production. Any other industrialization program can only be a program based on light consumer industries that are totally dependent on industrial raw material and industrial machines produced by the industrialized countries.

You will further note that the constitutional provision insists that industries should be competitive in both the domestic and foreign markets. With that provision, there is hardly any industry that can qualify for government support and protection, and that is precisely what the provision intends. That provision serves as justification for our reckless entry into GATT and the equally reckless accelerated tariff reduction program of the government - programs which have contributed heavily to the bankruptcy of National Steel Corporation, the closure of Caltex refinery and the financial problems of an enterprise like Hacienda Luisita, all of whom have attributed their crisis to the flood of imports unleashed by the government's commitments to the WTO.

No country rose from rags to riches through industrialization by exposing its industries to foreign competition the way we have done.

Examine the industrial policies of the Asian NICs and you will see how protective those policies are of their basic industries, even if these are not competitive in the foreign markets. While the constitutional provision does provide that the State shall protect Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign competition, it doesn't define what unfair foreign competition means. For example, we have exposed our agricultural sector to competition from subsidized agricultural imports, but the authorities don't consider that a contravention of the Constitution. The result is that even the agricultural sector has been marginalized. Apparently, the authorities see nothing wrong with pitting our farmers, most of whom hardly made it to sixth grade, with the corporate farmers of the industrial countries, who do their farming with the aid of satellites.

The authorities must be reminded that any underdeveloped economy struggling to industrialize would have to protect its basic industries from foreign competition, whether fair or unfair. To insist that even infant industries should be competitive in the foreign markets would be tantamount to killing these infant industries from the start.

he question is: Why did the authors of the present Constitution feel it necessary to qualify the industrialization mandate with the kind of restrictions they placed on it?

And the answer is that the authors of the cited provision were the very elements who had opposed the heavy industrialization program launched by Ferdinand Marcos in 1979. The Marcos industrial program was based the establishment of industries driven by machine power and not - repeat, not - by "sound agricultural development and agrarian reform" as stipulated by the present Constitution.

In brief, no less than the Constitution has become the barrier to the real industrialization of our economy. Under the "industrialization" provision of the Charter there isn't any way that this country can transform into a newly industrialized country or NIC.

Which means that there isn't any way we can get out of the poverty trap which has now mutated into a hunger crisis.

ARTICLE XII, SEC. I PAR. 2 OF THE CONSTITUTION IS THE BEST EVIDENCE OF OUR STATUS AS NEOCOLONIAL STATE. IT IS ALSO THE ULTIMATE WEAPON WHICH ENSURES THAT THE ANTI-INDUSTRIALIZATION AGENDA OF THE DODDS REPORT WILL REMAIN UNCHALLENGED BY ANY GOVERNMENT ELECTED UNDER THE PRESENT CHARTER.

If by some miracle we should have a government tomorrow bent on industrializing the economy by adopting the same industrial policies that have made industrialized countries of our neighbors, such a government would run afoul of the Constitution.

WHAT THEN IS TO BE DONE?

Complete the unfinished nationalist revolution of Bonifacio. What needs to be done is clearly to forge a national coalition of forces committed to recovering the sovereignty which American imperialism wrested from Bonifacio's revolution and to transform the Philippines from the neocolonial state that it is to the truly sovereign and independent state that it claims to be and should be.

Only when the Philippines becomes a truly sovereign and independent state can it then proceed to pursue the kind of developmental policies necessary to lift the economy out of the pre-industrial age of history and to catapult it to the ranks of newly industrialized countries.

Three processes that should be unleashed if social peace is to be achieved. Such a coalition could be forged on the basis of a program that would unleash three vital processes, namely: The process of decolonization, the process of industrialization and the process of economic democratization.

Only when these three processes are unleashed simultaneously, through a program of government crafted specifically for that purpose, can the nation begin the journey towards social peace. The reason is that social peace can only come with social justice and economic democracy.

But social justice and economic democracy can come about only if there is economic development, and economic development can come about only with an industrial revolution which in turn can come about only with national independence. I propose accordingly that no time be lost organizing a national coalition based on a program that would unleash the three processes of de-colonization, industrialization and economic democratization.

In 1986, I proposed such a program to the then ongoing Constitutional Commission - which that body completely ignored. I now propose that that program be adopted as a working basis of dialogue among all elements in Philippine society determined to transform the Philippines into a truly sovereign and independent state so that it may proceed with the war on mass poverty and thereby pave the way for the much longed social peace which has long eluded us. That program is embodied in a slim volume I authored titled Towards a New Economic Order and the Conquest of Mass Poverty, and which I incorporate by reference in this paper. That program, incidentally, is a synthesis of the basic principles found in the program of the Movement for the Advancement of Nationalism and the Vatican encyclicals which condemn laissez-faire capitalism and justify on moral grounds the principle of state activism in the economy.

Along with the program outlined in Towards a New Economic Order and the Conquest of Mass Poverty, I recommend the adoption, as a working basis of dialogue, an emergency program of government proposed by the Citizens Committee on the National Crisis last January, which I also incorporate by way of reference.

We must complete Bonifacio's unfinished revolution if we are to face up to the crisis that has made this only Christian nation in Asia a humanitarian disaster, where 80 percent of Filipino households live under hunger conditions.

The imperatives of national survival and the revolution against hunger which has now overtaken us call for nothing less than the revolutionary nationalism which forged Filipinos into one nation.

Only when the country commits itself to a program of government that would unleash the three processes of de-colonization, industrialization and economic democratization can it begin the march toward social peace because only a government committed to the unleashing of those three processes would have the credibility to deal with the insurgents and the secessionists. That is one way of saying that the road to social peace begins with the struggle to regain the sovereignty and independence which U.S. imperialism stole from Bonifacio's revolution.

That sovereignty and independence should be recovered at all cost if we are to survive as a viable society.

One final and concluding note: Debt repudiation

There isn't any way we can proceed to retrieve our sovereignty and independence unless we first repudiate the foreign debt. The repudiation of that debt should be the starting point of any genuine effort at national independence and sovereignty.

I have written the Senate a letter-memorandum outlining the case for unconditional debt repudiation and I incorporate that letter-memorandum to this paper by way of reference. I suggest that the Pilgrims for Peace initiate a signature campaign urging the Senate to adopt the letter-memorandum for debt repudiation.

Such a campaign could well serve as the catalyst for a nationwide coalition that would complete the unfinished revolution.

The principal contradiction

The contradiction between colonialism and nationalism remains the principal contradiction of Philippine society. To the resolution of that contradiction all other contradictions should be subordinated. The road to peace starts with that. It starts with the drive to eliminate colonialism in all its forms and from whatever source.

Recto, the consummate Filipino nationalist and Mao, the consummate Chinese Communist, will shake hands on that.

Monday, October 25, 2004

“IT’S GMA’S PAYBACK TIME ” - COURAGE

Press Release
by: COURAGE

Government employees are restive. Many government offices are slated for abolition, privatization, mergers, transfer, reorganization and rationalization which would. Almost everyday, Executive Orders in order to implement these are issued by Malacanang, the most recent of which is EO 366 or the rationalization of the functions and operations of the agencies under the Executive Branch of the government. Recent estimates range 300,00 to 420,000 government workers shall be affected by the administration’s streamlining efforts.

And the employees have reasons to be upset. For while tenured rank and file employees are being targeted for lay-off, early and forced retirement, the President is creating new offices and appointing new officials.

Since July this year, 8 new offices were created with 10 new cabinet level positions appointed to wit: Office the Presidential Adviser on Job Generation headed by former DA Secretary Luis Lorenzo Jr., Office of the Cabinet Officer for Provincial Events – Conrado Limcaoco, Offcie of the Political Adviser – Gabriel Claudio, Office of the Communications Director – Silvestre Afable, Presidential Adviser on Revenue Enhancement or PARE – Narciso Santiago and the Office for External Affairs – Eduardo Pamintuan (former NHA General Manager).

New Presidential advisers and consultants were also appointed such as Presidential Adviser for New Government Centers (Rodolfo del Rosario, former Davao del Norte Governor), Presidential Adviser for Rural Electrification (Francisco Silva, former NEA Chief), Pres’l. Adviser for Trade and Development (Rodolfo Severino, former Sec. Gen. Of the ASEAN), Pres’l. Adviser for Region VI (Raphael Coscolluela) and Pres’l. Assistant for Transport and Tricycle Concerns (Ariel Lim).

COURAGE the mother organization of government workers nationwide scored the Arroyo Administration’s “obvious double standard and political accommodations at the expense of the employees”.

“The cash-strapped government while pushing for streamlining of government workers is creating new offices and even allocating millions of funds for its operations to accommodate its political lackeys or those who helped her during the election”. COURAGE National President Ferdinand Gaite cited the new Office of External Affairs, which according to reports duplicates the functions of other government agencies such as the Department of Social Welfare and Development, the Department of Foreign Affairs and the National Anti-Poverty Commission. “Pamintuan’s minions at the OEA have nothing in their credentials to speak of aside from their former links with the militant cause oriented groups which clearly, they capitalized on to corner their posts. These are the same people behind the Kasimbayan and Pro-Gloria machinery of the administration during the elections where millions of government funds where siphoned to, in order to ‘sell’ a candidate the masses so detested”.

Gaite also pointed out Jun Santiago’s appointment as PARE the offcie which was created “to help govt find ways to ease current fiscal crisis”. Santiago is the husband of Senator Miriam Santiago who defected to the administration’s ticket before the election and a kumpare of President Arroyo who is Ninang to their adopted children.

As a sign of protest, employees of the National Housing Authority, Bureau of Animal Industry (BAI) and the Bureau of Plant Industry (BPI) today staged simultaneous noontime rallies in front of their respective offices. Said agencies are targetted for privatization.

COURAGE anounced that they will hold a nationwide protest against rationalization, privatization, transfer and other forms that directly undermine the employees’ jobs on October 28. Thousands of affected employees are expected to participate nationwide. #